We discuss a quantum key distribution scheme in which small phase and amplitude modulations of quantum limited, CW light beams carry the key information. We identify universal constraints on the level of shared information between the intended receiver (Bob) and any eavesdropper (Eve) and use this to make a general evaluation of the security and efficiency of the scheme.
INTRODUCTION
The distribution of random number keys for cryptographic purposes can be made secure by using the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics to ensure that any interception of the key information can be detected. This was first discussed for discrete systems in Refs. [1] [2] [3] . Experimental demonstrations have been carried out using low photon number, optical sources [4, 5] .
The basic mechanism used in quantum cryptographic schemes is the fact that the act of measurement in quantum mechanics inevitably disturbs the system. This measurement back-action exists for both discrete and continuous quantum mechanical variables. Thus it is natural to ask if quantum cryptographic schemes based on continuous variables are possible. There are a number of practical disadvantages with discrete quantum cryptographic schemes, mainly associated with the lack of true single photon sources. Also it is of fundamental interest to quantum information research to investigate links between discrete variable, single photon phenomena and continuous variable, multi-photon effects. This has motivated a consideration of quantum cryptographic schemes using multi-photon light modes [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
Most of these schemes use squeezed light [12] in their protocols, either by producing entanglement from the squeezing [10, 8, 9] or using the squeezing directly [7, 11] . In contrast to these, one scheme discussed in Ref. [6] is based on a coherent state. The signals from which the key material is obtained are encoded in various ways in the different schemes.
The question of optimum protocols and eavesdropper strategies has been studied in detail for the single quanta case [13] , leading to general proofs of security for discrete systems [14] . A general proof of the optimum eavesdropper strategy for a simple continuous variable scheme was presented in Ref. [10] . A general proof of absolute security for a more sophisticated scheme was presented in Ref. [11] .
In this chapter we will analyse in some detail quantum key distribution protocols based on the optical coherent state and squeezed state schemes introduced in Refs. [6, 10] . Our emphasis will be on specific implementations that Alice and Bob might use rather than general limits. The particular implementations have been chosen mostly for their simplicity rather than their optimality. Eve on the other hand is always assumed to be employing the optimum eavesdropping strategies allowed by quantum physics [15] . We estimate the efficiency of the two schemes and hence secure key transmission rates under conditions of negligible and non-negligible losses.
In Section I we review the encoding of information on light with small amplitude and phase modulations and introduce a particular encoding scheme. In Section II we find the minimum disturbance that an optimum eavesdropping scheme will introduce. The coherent state cryptographic scheme is introduced in Section III and the minimum error rates that an optimum Eve will introduce are calculated. In Section IV the concepts of mutual information, data reconciliation and privacy amplification are introduced and specific examples are applied to the coherent state scheme. The security and efficiency of the scheme are evaluated. The squeezed state cryptographic scheme is introduced, analysed and evaluated in Section V. In section VI we discuss a physical implementation of the optimal eavesdropper strategy and we conclude in Section VII.
I. ENCODING INFORMATION WITH SMALL AMPLITUDE AND PHASE MODULATIONS
One way of encoding information on a light beam is by imposing small modulations of the phase or amplitude of the beam at some radio frequency (rf) with respect to the main optical frequency. We suppose that these signals are imposed at an rf sufficiently large that technical noise can be ignored and so our measurement precision is limited only by quantum noise. Typically frequencies in excess of about a MHz will suffice. That quantum mechanics must impose limits in this situation is because the amplitude and and phase quadrature amplitudes of the beam are the analogues of position and momentum variables. Hence they are continuous, non-commuting variables that exhibit uncertainty relations.
We can represent our light field viâ
whereâ is a bosonic annihilation operator which we have decomposed into a steady state part, the coherent amplitude, α, treated classically, and two time varying parts: the quantum fluctuations, modelled by the operator δâ(t); and the classical modulation, modelled by δs(t). If we take the phase of α real then the amplitude fluctuations,X + , and the phase fluctuations,X − , are given bŷ
Homodyne detection using a local oscillator with a coherent amplitude much larger than that of the signal beam can be used to measure the fluctuations. Spectral analysis then extracts the fluctuation power at a particular rf, ω, such that
and
is the amplitude (phase) signal power. The tilde indicates a Fourier transform.
The amount of information that can be carried on a Gaussian, additive noise, communication channel, such as we will consider here, depends on the signal to noise [16] . For a fixed bandwidth, any reduction in the signal to noise will inevitably lead to increased errors in the transmission. In our cryptographic scheme signals will be encoded on both quadratures but read out from only one, randomly chosen. This will force any eavesdroppers to monitor both the amplitude and phase quadratures simultaneously. For these non-commuting observables the information that can be obtained in this way is strictly limited by the generalized uncertainty principle for simultaneous measurements [17, 18] . We will discuss this principle in detail in the next section. Here let us consider a simple example. Suppose we try to observe both quadratures by dividing the beam in two at a 50:50 beamsplitter and detecting the amplitude quadrature of one beam and the phase quadrature of the other. Originally the signal to noises are given by
However the signal to noises detected after the beamsplitter are
where we define T + (T − ), the amplitude (phase) signal transfer coefficient, as the ratio of signal to noise out to signal to noise in. The quantum noise which is inevitably added through the empty beamsplitter port is V ± m . The spectral powers are normalized to the quantum noise limit (QNL) such that a coherent beam has V ± n = 1. Normally the partition noise will also be at this limit (V ± m = 1). For a classical light field, i.e. where V ± n >> 1 the penalty will be negligible. However for a coherent beam a halving of the signal to noise for both quadratures is unavoidable.
To continue our analysis of this example let us consider the specific encoding scheme of binary pulse code modulation. The data is encoded as a train of pulses, a pulse on representing a "1", a pulse off representing a "0". For bandwidth limited transmission the bit error rate or error probability (B) and the signal to noise (S/N) are related by [19] 
Now suppose our signal to noise is initially 13 dB. From Eq.7 direct detection of a single quadrature will retrieve its pulse train with a bit error rate of 1%. If the beam is in a coherent state and we simultaneously detect both quadratures then Eq.6 tells us that the signal to noise is halved. Eq.7 then predicts the error rate will rise to 5%.
II. OPTIMUM EAVESDROPPER STRATEGY
In this section we will use the generalized uncertainty principle to identify the minimum disturbance allowed by quantum mechanics to the information Bob receives given a particular level of interception by Eve. The idea is shown schematically in Fig.1 . A single quantum limited beam is sent from Alice to Bob. Eve makes some unspecified interception of the beam enroute. Bob and Eve obtain some measurement results. We will show that quantum mechanics sets unambiguous limits on the level of quantum noise that must appear in Bob and Eve's results. In the following sections we will apply these results to specific quantum cryptographic systems.
A more general statement of the generalized uncertainty principle [18] requires that for any simultaneous measurements of conjugate quadrature amplitudes
where V ± M are the measurement penalties for the amplitude (+) and phase (−) quadratures, normalized to the amplification gain between the system observables and the measuring apparatus. For example suppose an attempt to measure the amplitude quadrature variance of a system V + k returned the result
Eq.6 follows directly from Eq.8 for ideal simultaneous measurements. Let us investigate what general restrictions this places on the information that Eve can intercept and the subsequent corruption of Bob's signal. Firstly Eve's measurements will inevitably carry measurement penalties V ± E constrained by
Now suppose Bob makes an ideal (no noise added) amplitude measurement on the beam he receives. In order to satisfy Eq.8 it must be true that the noise penalty carried on the amplitude quadrature of this beam V + B due to Eve's intervention, is sufficiently large such that
Similarly, Bob can also choose to make ideal measurements of the phase quadrature so we must also have
Eqs.9,10,11 set strict quantum mechanical limits on the minimum disturbance Eve can cause to Bob's information given a particular maximum quality of the information she receives. This applies regardless of the method she uses to eavesdrop. Note that quantum memory does not negate the above results provided we insist that Alice and Bob do not exchange any potentially revealing classical information until Alice is sure that Bob has received and measured her signals.
These relations could form the basis of a security analysis of any continuous variable quantum cryptographic scheme in which a single quantum beam is exchanged. However the ramifications of a particular level of disturbance will vary for different schemes. In the following section we will analyse the security of a very simple scheme based on the exchange of a beam in a coherent state.
III. COHERENT STATE QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
Consider the set up depicted in Fig.2 . A possible protocol is as follows. Alice generates two independent random strings of numbers and encodes one on the phase quadrature, and the other on the amplitude quadrature of a bright coherent beam. The amplitude and phase signals are imposed at the same frequency with equal power. Bob uses homodyne detection to detect either the amplitude or phase quadrature of the beam when he receives it. He swaps randomly which quadrature he detects. On a public line Bob then tells Alice at which quadrature he was looking, at any particular time. They pick some subset of Bob's data to be the test and the rest to be the key. For example, they may pick the amplitude quadrature as the test signal. They would then compare results for the times that Bob was looking at the amplitude quadrature. If Bob's results agreed with what Alice sent, to within some acceptable error rate, they would consider the transmission secure. They would then use the undisclosed phase quadrature signals, sent whilst Bob was observing the phase quadrature, to create their key. By randomly swapping which quadrature is key and which is test throughout the data comparison an increased error rate on either quadrature will immediately be obvious.
Before making a general analysis of security let us first consider some specific strategies an eavesdropper could adopt. Eve could guess which quadrature Bob is going to measure and measure it herself. She could then reproduce the digital signal of that quadrature and impress it on another coherent beam which she would send on to Bob. She would learn nothing about the other quadrature through her measurement and would have to guess her own random string of numbers to place on it. When Eve guesses the right quadrature to measure Bob and Alice will be none the wiser, however, on average 50% of the time Eve will guess wrong. Then Bob will receive a random string from Eve unrelated to the one sent by Alice. These will agree only 50% of the time. Thus Bob and Alice would see a 25% bit error rate in the test transmission if Eve was using this strategy. This is analogous to the result for single quanta schemes in which this type of strategy is the most readily available. Another single measurement strategy Eve could use is to do homodyne detection at a quadrature angle half-way between phase and amplitude. This fails because the signals become mixed. Thus Eve can tell when both signals are 0 or both are 1 but she cannot tell the difference between 1,0 and 0,1. This again leads to a 25% bit error rate.
However, for bright beams it is possible to make simultaneous measurements of the quadratures, with the caveat that there will be some loss of information. So a second strategy that Eve could follow would be to split the beam in half, measure both quadratures and impose the information obtained on the respective quadratures of another coherent beam which she sends to Bob. How well will this strategy work? We performed this calculation at the end of section I using Eq.7. The halving of signal to noise imposed by the 50:50 beamsplitter means the information Eve intercepts and subsequently passes on to Bob will have an error probability of 5% (for the particular case of bandwidth limited binary pulse code modulation). This is clearly a superior strategy and would be less easily detected. Further more Eve could adopt a third strategy of only intercepting a small amount of the beam and doing simultaneous detection on it. For example, by intercepting 16% of the beam, Eve could gain information about both quadratures with an error rate of 25% whilst Bob and Alice would observe only a small increase of their error rate to 1.7%. In other words Eve could obtain about the same amount of information about the key that she could obtain using the "guessing" strategy, whilst being more difficult to detect. Now let us analyze this coherent state scheme using Eqs.9,10,11. We choose to couch our evaluation in terms of bit error rates because they represent an unambiguous, directly observable measure of the extent to which Eve can intercept information and the resulting corruption of Bob's information. This connection will be developed in Section IV. Depending on the particular technique Eve uses Bob and Alice may be able to gain additional evidence for Eve's presence by comparing the absolute noise levels of the sent and received signals. This can only increase the security of the system. By considering a general limit on error rates we can find a minimum guaranteed security against eavesdropping regardless of the technique Eve employs.
The signal transfer coefficients for Bob and Eve will be given by
Substituting Eqs.12 into Eqs.9,10,11 and using the fact that V ± in = 1 we find
Eqs.13 clearly show that any attempt by Eve to get a good signal to noise on one quadrature (e.g. T + E → 1) results not only in a poor signal to noise in her information of the other quadrature (e.g. T − E → 0) but also a poor signal to noise for Bob on that quadrature (e.g. T − B → 0), making her presence obvious. This is the general limit of the guessing strategy presented in the last section and leads to the same error rates.
Because of the symmetry of Bob's readout technique Eve's best approach is a symmetric attack on both quadratures. Eqs.13 then reduces to two equations
If Eve extracts her maximum allowable signal to noise transfer, T ± E = 0.5, then ideally Bob suffers the same penalty T ± B = 0.5. This is the general limit of the second strategy of the previous section. The same reduction in Bob's signal to noise occurs as in the specific implementation thus this implementation can be identified as an optimum eavesdropper strategy for obtaining maximum simultaneous information about both quadratures.
Eve's best strategy is to intercept only as much information as she can without being detected. The system will be secure if that level of information can be made negligible.
Suppose, as in the last section, Eve only intercepts a signal transfer of T ± E = .08. From Eq.14 this means Bob can receive at most a signal transfer of T ± B = .92. This is greater than the result for the specific implementation discussed in the last section, thus that implementation is not an optimum eavesdropper strategy. Using the optimum eavesdropper strategy the error rates for the specific encoding scheme discussed in the last section will be: if Eve intercepts information with an error probability of 25%, then the minimum error rate in Bob's information will be 1.4%.
In Fig.3 we represent the general situation by plotting the minimum error rate Bob and Alice can observe against the error rate in Eve's intercepted information. An error rate of 50% (i.e. completely random) represents no information about the data. Two traces are shown, representing different initial signal to noises in Alice's data. This graph shows that in principle any incursion by Eve will result in some increase in Bob and Alice's error rate. However one could also argue that any finite resolution in Bob and Alice's determination of their error rate will allow Eve to do better than the random result. In order to assess whether this system can be made secure we need to introduce the concepts of mutual information and privacy amplification.
IV. MUTUAL INFORMATION AND PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
The mutual information of party 1 and party 2 is the information overlap between the data possessed by the two parties. The binary entropy of party 1's data, x, is given by
where p x and 1 − p x are the probabilities of the two outcomes. Similarly party 2's data, y, has binary entropy
The joint entropy of the two data strings is then given by
with p x,y the joint probabilities. The mutual information is defined
If the two data strings x and y are random then H(x) = H(y) = 1. Suppose the error probability between the data strings is B, then the joint probabilities are given by p 0,0 = p 1,1 = 1 − B and p 0,1 = p 1,0 = B. Thus we find
Suppose A is Alice's data string, B is Bob's data string and E is Eve's data string. Maurer has shown [20] that provided H(A : B) > H(A : E) then it is in principle possible for Alice and Bob to extract a secret key from the data. Eve's mutual information with this secret key can be made arbitrarily small. From Eq.19 we see that this condition will be satisfied provided Bob's error rate is less than Eve's. From Fig.3 we see that provided Alice and Bob's error rate does not exceed 5% for case (a) or 12% for case (b) then secret key generation is in principle possible. In the following we will look at a simple specific example of a secret key generation protocol and evaluate its efficiency. Because of the transmission errors (and possibly the actions of Eve) Alice and Bob won't share the same data string. However techniques exist for data reconciliation which allow Alice and Bob to select with high probability a subset of their data which is error free, whilst giving Eve minimal extra knowledge. As a simple example Alice and Bob could perform a parity check on randomly chosen pairs of bits. If the error rate between Bob and Alice is low then the probability of both bits being wrong is very low. Thus discarding all pairs which fail the parity check will lead to a big reduction in errors in the shared data whilst not revealing the values of the individual bits to Eve. A series of parity checks will lead with high probability to zero errors. Eve can also remove the pairs that Bob removes and in a worse case scenario may remove up to the same number of errors as Bob. But if Eve initially had significantly more errors than Bob then she will still have significant errors after the reconciliation, whilst Bob and Alice will have virtually none. The data string length will be reduced by a factor of approximately 1 − 2B B , where B B is Bob's error probability.
In order to reduce Eve's mutual information to a negligible amount the technique of privacy amplification is employed [21] . This involves the random hashing or block coding of the reconciled key into a shorter key. As a simple example Alice and Bob could randomly pick data strings of length n from the reconciled key and form a new key from the sum, modulo 2, of each n unit block. It is important that the privacy amplification is "orthogonal" to the reconciliation protocol. That is none of the pairs used in the parity checks should appear together in the privacy amplification blocks. The length of the new key will be reduced by a factor of 1/n. The error probability in the new key will be given by
where B is the error probability of the original string. If B ≈ 0, as for Bob and Alice, then this process introduces virtually no errors. But when Eve copies this process her errors will be "amplified", hopefully to the point where her mutual information is negligible. Some caution is required in evaluating Eve's mutual information now. Just as Bob and Alice were able to select a sub-set of results they knew were correct in the reconciliation process, so Eve can also obtain a (smaller) subset of results for which she has greater confidence. We make the worst case assumption that after privacy amplification Eve is left with some small probability, p r , of possessing certain bits that she knows are right, and a large probability, 1 − p r , of possessing bits which are completely random. In such a situation it is appropriate to set Eve's mutual information as
where B pae is Eve's average error probability, as given by Eq.20.
Let us now apply these techniques to the continuous variable protocol of the previous section to evaluate its security. After Bob has received all the data from Alice he tells her at which quadrature he was looking at any particular time and Alice sorts out her sent data accordingly. They then compare a randomly chosen sub-section of their data (approximately half) and determine the error rate. For the example in the previous section they expect a base error rate of 1%. Let them reject the data and start again if they detect an error rate of ≥ 2%. To be cautious, let us assume that in fact the error rate could have been as high as 2.5%. For sufficiently long data strings there will be negligible probability of this error rate being exceeded in the undisclosed data [22] . From Fig.3 (trace (a) ) we can read off that Eve's error rate must be ≥10.5%. Applying our simple information reconciliation protocol Bob and Alice's error probability can be reduced to virtually zero whilst Eve's error rate is ≥8%. We now apply privacy amplification. Fig.4 (trace (a) ) shows Eve's mutual information as a function of the block length, n. Clearly Eve's mutual information is decreasing exponentially as a function of block length. This is the signature of a secure system. A linear expenditure of resources results in an exponentially small mutual information with Eve. In fact Bob and Alice can do better by using a smaller initial signal strength. If Alice reduces the size of the signal she sends to about half that of the previous example (now with a signal to noise of about 10dB) Bob's base error rate will rise to 5%. They set their error threshold at 6%. To be cautious we assume the error rate could be as high as 6.5%. From Fig.3 (trace (b) ) we find that Eve's error rate must be ≥26%. After reconciliation Eve's error rate must still be ≥19.5%. Fig.4 (trace(b) ) plots Eve's mutual information as a function of the block length for this situation showing a more rapid decay. This is approximately the optimum signal strength. However Alice and Bob may also seek to improve the efficiency of the system by employing more sophisticated reconciliation and privacy amplification protocols.
To this point we have assumed that the transmission line between Alice and Bob is lossless. In practice this will not be true. If we make no constraints on Eve's technical abilities then we must assume that all lost light has fallen into her hands [23] . Thus we must calculate Eve's potential mutual information from Bob's error rate as if there was no loss, but we must set our error threshold quite high because the losses will drive up Bob's errors. It is clear that loss of 50% or more can not be tolerated because Eve's and Bob's error rates become equal at this point. Indeed as losses approach 50% the expenditure of resources by Bob and Alice needed to reconcile and privacy amplify will increase rapidly.
Let us estimate by what factor the length of the final secure key would be reduced over the length of the original string sent by Alice in a system with 25% loss. Consider an original signal to noise of about 10dB, leading to a base error rate with 25% loss of 7.7%. Setting as before our maximum error rate 1.5% above the base rate at 9.3% we can bound Eve's error rate at ≥16.3%. Bob and Alice sacrifice half their data in this step. Reconciliation will reduce Bob and Alice's data string by a factor of 0.81 and leave Eve with an error rate ≥7%. If we require that Eve's mutual information be ≤0.001 for the transmission to be considered secure then we find a block length of n = 46 is required in the privacy amplification step. Thus the secure key will be reduced by a factor of 0.5 × 0.81 × 0.02 = 0.01. (A similar estimate for the optimum no loss case gives a reduction factor of 0.025) Data transmission via rf signals is a mature technology and bit transmission rates of 100 MHz would seem quite reasonable. Thus secure key transmission rates of a a MHz would seem practical under these conditions. This is about three orders of magnitude better than what is presently achievable with single photon schemes. On the other hand it should be noted that single quanta schemes can tolerate much higher losses [4] .
V. SQUEEZED STATE QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
The preceding discussion has shown that a cryptographic scheme based on coherent light can produce secure keys with an efficiency of about 1/40 → 1/100. We now consider whether squeezed light can offer improved efficiency.
The set-up is shown in Fig.5 . Once again Alice encodes her number strings digitally, but now she impresses them on the amplitude quadratures of two, phase locked, amplitude squeezed beams, a and b, one on each. A π/2 phase shift is imposed on beam b and then they are mixed on a 50:50 beamsplitter. The resulting output modes, c and d, are given by
These beams are now in an entangled state which will exhibit Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (EPR) type correlations [24, 26] . Negligible information about the signals can be extracted from the beams individually because the large fluctuations of the anti-squeezed quadratures are now mixed with the signal carrying squeezed quadratures. One of the beams, say c, is transmitted to Bob. The other beam, d, Alice retains and uses homodyne detection to measure either its amplitude or phase fluctuations, with respect to a local oscillator in phase with the original beams a and b. She randomly swaps which quadrature she measures, and stores the results. Bob, upon receiving beam c, also randomly chooses to measure either its amplitude or phase quadrature and stores his results. After the transmission is complete Alice sends the results of her measurements on beam d to Bob on an open channel. About half the time Alice will have measured a different quadrature to Bob in a particular time window. Bob discards these results. The rest of the data corresponds to times when they both measured the same quadratures. If they both measured the amplitude quadratures of each beam Bob adds them together, in which case he can obtain the power spectrum
where the tilde indicate Fourier transforms. Thus he obtains the data string impressed on beam a, V s,a , imposed on the sub-QNL noise floor of beam a, V + n,a . Alternatively if they both measured the phase quadratures of each beam, Bob subtracts them, in which case he can obtain the power spectrum
i.e. he obtains the data string impressed on beam b, V s,b , imposed on the sub-QNL noise floor of beam b, V + n,b . Thus the signals lie on conjugate quadratures but both have sub-QNL noise floors. This is the hallmark of the EPR correlation [27] . As for the coherent state case Alice and Bob now compare some sub-set of their shared data and check for errors. If the error rate is sufficiently low they deem their transmission secure and use reconciliation and privacy amplification on the undisclosed sub-set of their data to produce a secure key.
Consider now eavesdropper strategies. Eve must intercept beam c if she is to extract any useful information about the signals from the classical channel (containing Alice's measurements of beam d) sent later. She can adopt the guessing strategy by detecting a particular quadrature of beam c and then using a similar apparatus to Alice's to re-send the beam and a corresponding classical channel later. As before she will only guess correctly what Bob will measure half the time thus introducing a BER of 25%. Instead she may try simultaneous detection of both quadratures of beam c. As in the coherent case the noise she introduces into her own measurement (V ± E ) and that she introduces into Bob's (V ± B ) are in general limited according to Eqs.9,10 and 11. However now the consequences of these noise limits on the signal to noise transfers that Eve and Bob can obtain behave quite differently because the signals they are trying to extract lie on sub-QNL backgrounds. The maximum signal transfer coefficients that Eve can extract are given by
Similarly Bob's are
To achieve maximum security we require that the anti-squeezed quadratures of the beams have large excess noise. This could easily be arranged experimentally. The maximum signal transfer coefficients (Eq.25 and Eq.26) then reduce to
and similarly Bob's are
For the squeezed noise floors the same (V + n,a = V + n,b = V n ) we find the signal transfers are restricted via
If squeezing is strong then almost any level of interception by Eve will result in very poor signal transfer to Bob. In Fig.6 we show plots of error rates of Bob versus minimum error rates of Eve for various levels of squeezing. In comparison with the coherent scheme ( Fig.3) it can be seen that larger disturbances are caused in Bob's information for the same quality of Eve's interception. As a numerical example consider the specific encoding scheme of section I and suppose the squeezing is 10 dB (V n = 0.1). Assuming no loss and using the same assumptions as those used to evaluate the coherent scheme in the last section we find that a secure key of length 0.07 times the original data string length can be generated. That is an efficiency of about 1/14, to be compared to the coherent case of 1/40, a clear improvement. Unfortunately this high sensitivity to interception by Eve also results in a high sensitivity to loss. For the case above the break even point between Bob and Eve's errors is for a loss of only 16%. The squeezing system can only be used to advantage if the loss in the transmission is much less than this value. Thus we find that although in principle squeezing improves the efficiency of the scheme, in practice the constraints on the quality of the transmission become quite critical.
VI. TELEPORTATION AS THE OPTIMUM EAVESDROPPER STRATEGY
It is interesting to consider what physical techniques Eve could use to realize the optimal attack strategy we have assumed her capable of throughout this discussion. Firstly she would need to replace the lossy transmission line that Bob and Alice are using with her own transmission line of negligible loss. Given that Bob and Alice will presumably employ the most efficient transmission line they can obtain, Eve's job is not trivial. Secondly she must extract information from the transmission with the least possible disturbance, such that the inequalities of Eqs.9,10 and 11 are saturated. In Ref. [10] it was shown that Eve can use continuous variable teleportation [29, 30, 26] as such an optimum eavesdropper strategy. In this section we will review that result.
Quantum teleportation uses shared entanglement to convert quantum information into classical information and then back again (see Fig.6 ). In particular continuous variable teleportation uses 2-mode squeezed light as its entanglement resource. In the limit of very strong squeezing no information about the teleported system can be extracted from the classical channel but a perfect reproduction of the quantum system can be retrieved. On the other hand with lower levels of squeezing some information about the system can be obtained from the the classical channel but at the expense of a less than perfect reproduction. We show in the following that under particular operating conditions the disturbance in the teleported state is precisely the minimum required by the generalized uncertainty principle, given the quality of information that can be extracted from the classical channel. Teleportation thus constitutes an optimum eavesdropper strategy.
Eve's strategy would be to send the field she intercepts from Alice through a teleporter, adjusted such that she can read some information out of the classical channel, but still reconstruct the field sufficiently well such that Bob and Alice don't see a large error rate. The classical channel of a lossless continuous variable teleporter can be written [10, 26] 
wheref in is the annihilation operator of the input to the teleporter andĵ 1 = √ Gv 1 + √ G − 1v † 2 is the annihilation operator for one of the entangled beams. Thev i are the vacuum mode inputs to the squeezers, G is the parametric gain of the squeezers and K >> 1 is the measurement amplification factor. Being a classical channel simultaneous measurements of both quadratures can be made without additional penalty thus immediately Eve's measurement penalty is
For no squeezing (G = 1) V ± E = 1, the minimum possible for simultaneous detection of both quadratures (see Eq.9). For large squeezing (G >> 1) V ± E become very large and Eve can obtain little information from the classical channel.
The output of the teleporter is given bŷ
where λ is the gain of the teleporter andĵ 2 = √ Gv 2 + √ G − 1v † 1 is the annihilation operator for the other entangled beam. Thus Bob's measurement penalty for ideal measurements of either of the quadratures is
If Eve operates the teleporter with gain [31]
and so Eve causes the minimum allowable disturbance, i.e. V ± E V ± B = 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have investigated continuous variable quantum cryptography as it could be realized in optics by analysing the security and efficiency of specific implementations of two systems based on coherent and squeezed state light respectively. An Eve employing an optimal eavesdropper attack is assumed throughout. A possible optimal attack strategy that Eve could employ is outlined.
We find that the coherent scheme can be made secure, but is not very efficient. Nonethe-less, given the maturity of optical communication technology based on rf modulation, this system may be competitive with discrete schemes in a local network scenario.
The squeezed state scheme can also be made secure and in principle is more efficient than the coherent state system. However its greater sensitivity to losses could make it less practical.
We have looked at simple protocols throughout this analysis. It could be expected that more sophisticated encoding, reconciliation and privacy amplification techniques would lead to significant improvements in performance. 
